In this paper, we initiate the systematic study of solving linear programs under differential privacy. The first step is simply to define the problem: to this end, we introduce several natural classes of private linear programs that capture different ways sensitive data can be incorporated into a linear program. For each class of linear programs we give an efficient, differentially private solver based on the multiplicative weights framework, or we give an impossibility result.
Introduction
Linear programming is one of the most fundamental and powerful tools in algorithmic design. It is used ubiquitously throughout computer science: applications include maximum matching, maximum and minimum cost flow, and fractional packing and covering problems. Linear programming relaxations of NP-complete problems also underlie countless efficient approximation algorithms.
At the same time, differential privacy is a field where efficient algorithms have been difficult to find. For many problems in differential privacy, the initial focus was on understanding the information-theoretic complexity-the extent to which solving the problem, efficiently or not, is compatible with differential privacy. As a result, there are many central problems that are known to be privately solvable, but for which computationally efficient algorithms are not known. For example, Kasiviswanathan et al. [19] show how to privately PAC learn any PAC learnable concept class (without privacy) with only a small increase in the sample complexity, but via an exponential time algorithm. It remains open whether a computationally efficient algorithm can do this in general. Similarly, Blum et al. [4] show how to privately release a summary of a private database that approximately preserves the answers to rich families of linear queries, again via an exponential time algorithm. In fact, under standard cryptographic assumptions, it is not possible to efficiently and privately answer large collections of general linear queries [9, 28, 27] .
The two preceding examples do not lie in isolation-they are among the many algorithms that use the extremely general exponential mechanism of McSherry and Talwar [23] to achieve near optimal error. However, the exponential mechanism is often not efficient: it typically requires running time linear in the size of its output range, which can be extremely large. In contrast, general tools for designing efficient differentially private algorithms are harder to come by (although not non-existent, e.g., the sample and aggregate framework [24] , and output and objective perturbation for unconstrained convex optimization [5, 21] ).
Our work contributes to the toolbox of general algorithmic techniques for designing computationally efficient and differentially private algorithms; specifically, we give tools to privately and efficiently solve linear programs (LPs) of various types. An initial problem is to simply define what it means to solve a linear program privately. Differential privacy is often defined in terms of neighboring databases: a database is a collection of records from some domain, one for each individual, and two databases are neighboring if they differ in the record of a single individual. Differential privacy requires the output distribution of an algorithm to be nearly identical when run on either of a pair of neighboring databases. If linear programs can depend on private data, we naturally have a notion of neighboring linear programs, and we want an algorithm for solving these linear programs that is differentially private with respect to this notion of neighboring inputs.
The way in which the linear program is derived from the database gives rise to several distinct notions of neighboring linear programs. For instance, consider an LP with objective c ⊤ x and constraints Ax ≤ b, where moving to a neighboring LP neighboring database leaves c and A unchanged but perturbs b by only a small amount in each coordinate. Solving this kind of linear programming privately is similar to solving the classic linear query release problem from the differential privacy literature, and techniques for query release-such as the private multiplicative weights algorithm of Hardt and Rothblum [15] (and its offline variants [14, 16] )-can be adapted with minor changes. (This result may even be considered folklore.) On the other hand, the situation is qualitatively different if moving to a neighboring LP can change either the constraint matrix A or the objective vector c. Some of these private LPs can still be solved; others are provably impossible to solve to nontrivial accuracy under differential privacy.
In this paper, we develop a taxonomy of private LPs. For each class, we either present an efficient and accurate (and private) solver, or prove that general LPs of this type cannot be accurately solved while preserving privacy.
Our Results and Techniques
We consider linear programs LP (D) defined by a private database D, with standard form
Here, the vector x represents the variables to be solved for in the linear program, and c, A, b ≡ c(D), A(D), b(D) may each depend on the private database D. Our goal is to find an approximate (in a sense to be defined) solution to LP (D) while ensuring differential privacy for the underlying database D.
In classifying the LPs, we first make a distinction between how much the private portions of the linear program can change. In low-sensitivity LPs, neighboring problems have only small differences between coefficients. For instance, the linear program may depend on averages over a private database; if the database has n records in [0, 1], the sensitivity of an average is naturally 1/n. In general, we say low-sensitivity to mean sensitivity decreasing in n. In contrast, high-sensitivity LPs have neighboring problems with arbitrary differences between some of their coefficients, where the sensitivity need not decrease in n.
The second distinction we make is where the private data is located in the LP; we consider the following four natural locations.
1. The constraints: For these linear programs, A = A(D) and b = b(D) depend on the private data, while the objective vector c does not. We have different results for the high and low-sensitivity cases.
In the high-sensitivity case (Section 3), which we call constraint private LPs, moving to a neighboring database can change a single row of A and the corresponding entry of b arbitrarily. That is, for every pair of neighboring databases D, D ′ , there exists a row i such that for every
This kind of linear program arises, for example, in packing or covering problems (e.g., set cover) in which each individual represents a constraint to be satisfied (e.g., each individual is an element to be covered and he wants to hide which sets he can be covered by). We cannot hope to approximately satisfy every constraint while ensuring differential privacy 1 like we can for query release LPs, but we show that by using a variant of multiplicative weights that operates only over a restricted set of distributions, we can still find solutions to such LPs that approximately satisfy almost all of the constraints. As an example of our technique, we solve a private version of the fractional set cover problem.
In the low-sensitivity case (Section 4.3), which we call row private LPs, moving to a neighboring database can change a single row of A in a low-sensitivity way: say, for some row i,
We show how to solve these LPs using multiplicative weights; our techniques work also equally well if the entire constraint matrix can change on neighboring problems, which we call matrix privacy.
2.
The scalars: For these linear programs, only b = b(D) depends on the private database D, while c and A are constants. We first consider the low-sensitivity case, which we call query release LPs because they capture the private linear query release problem for generating synthetic data. In this standard problem from the privacy literature, the database is viewed as a histogram D ∈ N d + and the objective is to find a synthetic database x ∈ R d + such that for every linear query q in some family, q, x ≈ q, D . We show how to adapt existing techniques for this problem and derive resulting accurate solvers for LPs of this form (Section 4.2). Then, we show that the high-sensitivity variant of this kind of LP is not solvable under differential privacy (Section 5.1).
3.
One column in A: Like constraint and row private LPs, let A = A(D) depend on the private data, while b, c remain constant. Constraint and row private LPs change in a single row of their constraint matrix A when moving between neighboring databases; a related case are LPs which can change in a single column of A when moving to a neighboring database. We call 1 For example, given a solution x to LP (D), we can always derive a new constraint (Ai, bi) that is far from being satisfied by x. If we introduce this new constraint in a neighboring linear program LP (D ′ ), by the differential privacy condition, this new constraint must also be far from being satisfied in LP (D ′ ) with high probability.
these column private LPs, and they arise literally as the dual linear programs of row private LPs. For example, in a LP where variables represent different tasks, the private coefficients corresponding to a single variable may represent the amount of resources needed for that task. Then, a packing LP seeks to maximize some objective subject to resource constraints.
We first consider the low-sensitivity version of this problem (Section 4.4). We show that such programs can be solved efficiently, accurately, and privately using multiplicative weights. While this is a special case of matrix private LPs, we can sometimes get better accuracy when restricting to column private LPs. Then, we show that solving high-sensitivity column private LPs is impossible under differential privacy (Section 5.3).
4.
The objective: For these linear programs, the objective vector c = c(D) depends on the private data, while A and b are constant. We first consider the low-sensitivity case-for instance, every neighboring pair of databases
. This kind of linear program can be solved inefficiently to high accuracy by selecting from the set of vertices of the feasible polytope with the exponential mechanism; we show that linear programs in this class can also be solved efficiently and accurately, by directly using randomized response.
We then consider the high-sensitivity case, where a single coefficient of c can change arbitrarily when we move from a database D to a neighboring database D ′ , but the other coefficients must remain unchanged. That is, for every neighboring pair D, D ′ , there exists i such that for every This taxonomy is summarized in Table 1 . We will formally define accuracy, but roughly speaking, an accurate solution satisfies each constraint to within additive α, and has objective within additive α of optimal (when there is an objective). The exception is constraint privacy, where our algorithm finds a solution that satisfies only most of the constraints to within additive α, and may violate the other constraints arbitrarily. 
Related Work
Over the last decade, differential privacy (which emerged from a line of work initiated by Dinur and Nissim [6] , and was defined by Dwork et al. [8] ) has become a standard privacy solution concept in computer science. There is far too much work to summarize; here we mention just the most relevant results. (The interested reader can consult the excellent survey by Dwork [7] .)
Private optimization has been studied since Blum et al. [3] , Kasiviswanathan et al. [19] , who considered the problem of privately learning a classifier, an optimization problem over a space of classifiers to minimize the classification error loss function. Blum et al. [3] give an efficient reduction from SQ learning to private SQ learning, and Kasiviswanathan et al. [19] give a very general but inefficient reduction from PAC learning to private PAC learning using the powerful exponential mechanism of McSherry and Talwar [23] . Private learning was placed explicitly into an optimization framework by Chaudhuri et al. [5] , who give two techniques for privately solving certain unconstrained convex optimization problems. Gupta et al. [12] give several algorithms for problems in private combinatorial optimization, but these were specialized combinatorial algorithms for specific problems.
In parallel, a long line of work initiated by Blum et al. [4] and continuing with Dwork et al. [9] , Roth and Roughgarden [26] , Dwork et al. [10] , Hardt and Rothblum [15] , Gupta et al. [14] , Hardt et al. [16] study the problem of privately producing synthetic data consistent with some private database on many linear queries. (Of particular note is the private multiplicative weights mechanism of Hardt and Rothblum [15] , which achieves the best possible accuracy and running time bounds in general.) This problem can be represented as a class of linear programs with queries defining constraints, and indeed, the private multiplicative weights algorithm of Hardt and Rothblum [15] can be directly applied to solve this class of linear programs. This observation motivates our current investigation.
Our algorithms are mostly based on different variants of the multiplicative weights method of solving linear programs, which was introduced by Plotkin et al. [25] (see the excellent survey by Arora et al. [2] for more details). Whereas Plotkin et al. [25] maintain a distribution over the dual variables with multiplicative weights, depending on the kind of linear program we are solving, we either maintain a distribution over the dual variables, or the primal variables. To solve constraint private LPs, we use a combination of the multiplicative weights update method and Bregman projections [2]-Hsu et al. [18] use a similar version of this technique in designing analyst private mechanisms. Solving linear programs is also very similar to solving zero-sum games, something that can also be done by multiplicative weights [11] .
Differential Privacy Preliminaries
Differential privacy is a strong notion of privacy, first introduced by Dwork et al. [8] . In the typical setting, we consider a database as a multisets of records, each belonging to a single individual. Then, a randomized function from databases to an output range satisfies differential privacy if, for any change in a single record of the input database, the distribution on outputs remains roughly the same. More formally, we have the following definition.
Definition 1 (Dwork et al. [8] ). Let ǫ > 0 and 0 ≤ δ < 1 be given. A randomized function M : D → R mapping databases to an output range is (ǫ, δ)-differentially private if for every subset S ⊆ R and for every pair of database D, D ′ that differ in a single record,
When δ = 0, we will say that M is ǫ-differentially private.
We will use two basic mechanisms from differential privacy: the Laplace mechanism and the exponential mechanism. The Laplace mechanism privately releases a number by adding noise drawn from the Laplace distribution. 
The Laplace mechanism applied to a ∆-sensitive function releases
where ν is a draw from the Laplace distribution with parameter ǫ/∆; that is, with probability density function
The Laplace mechanism is ǫ-differentially private and satisfies the following tail bound, which is also an accuracy guarantee for the Laplace mechanism.
Lemma 3. Let β ∈ (0, 1) be given, and let ν be drawn from the Laplace distribution with scale b. Then,
We will also use the exponential mechanism [23] , which can privately produce a non-numeric or discrete output. The exponential mechanism is defined in terms of a quality score that maps a database and an element of the range to a real valued score. For a given a database, the exponential mechanism privately outputs an element of the range that approximately maximizes the quality score. [23] ). Let ǫ > 0 be given, and suppose the quality score Q : R×D → R is ∆-sensitive in the database. On database D, the ǫ-private exponential mechanism with quality score Q outputs r ∈ R with probability proportional to
Definition 4 (McSherry and Talwar
The exponential mechanism is ǫ-differentially private, and satisfies the following accuracy guarantee. [23] ). Let β ∈ (0, 1) and the database D be given. Suppose that the maximum value of the quality score Q on database D is OPT. Then, the ǫ-private exponential mechanism with quality score Q on D outputs r ∈ R such that
Theorem 5 (McSherry and Talwar
To combine these mechanisms, we will use standard composition theorems.
Theorem 6 (Dwork et al. [10] ). For any δ ∈ (0, 1), the composition of k (adaptively chosen) ǫ ′ -private mechanisms is (ǫ, δ)-differentially private, for
.
Constraint Private LPs
Let us begin by considering constraint private LPs, with the general form
where A ∈ R m×d , b ∈ R m , c ∈ R d , and K ⊆ R d , thinking of K as the easy constraints (e.g., non-negativity).
Then, the original LP can be solved approximately by repeatedly solving the feasibility problem
binary searching on the optimal objective value OPT. 2 Thus, unless we specify otherwise, we will restrict our attention to feasibility LPs. Furthermore, since a linear program has a convex feasible region, K (and hence K OPT ) are convex. From now on, we will write K for K OPT .
To define constraint privacy, we want to find a solution that hides whether a single constraint is in the LP or not. 
Solving LPs with Dense Multiplicative Weights
A standard approach to solving LPs is via no-regret algorithms. For a brief summary, these algorithms operate over a series of timesteps, selecting a single action at each step. Once the action is selected, the loss for each action is revealed (perhaps adversarially); the no-regret algorithm then adjusts to favor actions with less loss. While LPs can be solved using any no-regret algorithm, for concreteness we use the multiplicative weights update algorithm.
Throughout, we will use calligraphic letters (A) to denote sets of actions, Roman letters (A) to denote measures on those actions A : A → [0, 1], and letters with tildes ( A) to denote a probability distributions over actions. We will write |A| to mean the density of measure A, defined to be a∈A A a . We will use a variant of the standard multiplicative weights algorithm that maintains a smooth distribution over the set of constraints, i.e., a distribution that doesn't place too much probability on any action. We will call this algorithm the dense multiplicative weights algorithm (Algorithm 1); this algorithm was first proposed by Herbster and Warmuth [17] . Roughly, the algorithm projects the MW distribution on actions into the set of smooth distributions at each step. The loss at each step will be defined by a point that approximately satisfies the average constraint weighted by the MW distribution-by capping the probability on any constraint, we ensure that this point can be selected privately even when a single constraint can change arbitrarily on neighboring instances. We first define this projection step, also known as a Bregman projection. Definition 7. Let s > 0. Given a measure A such that |A| ≤ s, let Γ s A be the (Bregman) projection of A into the set of 1/s-smooth distributions, setting Γ s A a = 1 s · min{1, cA a } for every a ∈ A, where s = a∈A min{1, cA(a)}. Theorem 8 (Herbster and Warmuth [17] ). Let A 1 be the uniform measure of density 1 and let B t be the sequence of projected distributions obtained by DM W s,η with arbitrary losses ℓ t satisfying ℓ t ∞ ≤ 1 and η ≤ 1/2. Let B * be the uniform distribution on some subset S * ⊆ A of size s. Then,
Recall we can assume that we know the optimal value OPT, so the objective can be represented as the constraint c ⊤ x = OPT. Hence, let K = {x ∈ R d + | c ⊤ x = OPT} be the public feasible set. We will assume that there is a known, data-independent upper bound ρ such that
which we call the width of the LP.
To solve linear programs, we use the dense multiplicative weights algorithm to maintain a distribution over the constraints, and pick points x t ∈ K that best satisfy the weighted combination of constraints at each step. Intuitively, the losses will lead to more weight on violated constraints, leading to points that are more feasible. Taking the average of the points x t will yield an approximately feasible point, if it exists. See Algorithm 2 for the full algorithm.
We note that similar techniques for solving linear programs using multiplicative weights have been known since at least Plotkin et al. [25] ; the novelty in our approach is that we use multiplicative weights paired with a projection onto the set of smooth distributions, and show that the solution approximately satisfies most of the constraints. As we will see, the projection step is needed for privacy.
Algorithm 2 Solving for LP feasibility with dense multiplicative weights
Input A ∈ R m×d , b ∈ R m . Let y 1 be the uniform distribution in R m , ρ ≥ max x∈K Ax − b ∞ be the width of the LP, and s ∈ N be the smoothness parameter Set η = log m T , T = 36ρ 2 log m α 2 .
For t = 1, . . . , T : Find
where
Update y t+1 from y t and ℓ t via dense multiplicative weights with smoothness s.
In general, suppose that we have an oracle for approximately solving the minimization problem.
Definition 9. An (α, β)-approximate, ρ-bounded oracle is an algorithm that given a distribution y, with probability at least 1 − β finds x * such that
If the oracle is sufficiently accurate, we can bound the number of iterations needed. (For a concrete example of such an oracle in the context of fractional set cover, see the next section.) Theorem 10. Let 0 < α ≤ 9ρ, and let β ∈ (0, 1). Suppose there is a feasible solution of the linear program. Then with probability at least 1 − β, Algorithm 2 with smoothness parameter s run with an (α/3, β/T )-approximate, ρ-bounded oracle finds a point x * in K such that there is a set of constraints S of size at most |S| < s, with A i x * ≤ b i + α for every i / ∈ S.
Proof. By a union bound over T steps, the oracle succeeds on all steps with probability at least 1 − β; condition on this event.
Let K s = {y ∈ R m | 1 ⊤ y, y ∞ ≤ 1/s} be the set of 1/s-smooth distributions. Then, y ⊤ Ax * ≤ y ⊤ b for any y ∈ K s , so in particular the oracle finds x t with y ⊤ Ax t < y ⊤ b + α/3.
Thus, the loss vectors ℓ t = (1/2ρ)(b − Ax t ) + 1/2 satisfy ℓ t · y t ≥ 1/2 − α/6ρ, which is at least −1 if α ≤ 9ρ. Since the oracle is ρ-bounded, ℓ t · y t ≤ 1. So, Theorem 8 applies; for p any point in K s , we have the following bound:
Thus,
x t , and rearrange:
By our choice of η and T , we get
Since this holds for any p ∈ K s , x satisfies all but s − 1 constraints with error α-if it didn't, letting p be the uniform distribution on the s violated constraints would give a contradiction.
Achieving Constraint Privacy
Now, we will see how to make Algorithm 2 constraint private. First, the output point depends on the private data (the constraints A) only through the minimization step. Thus, if we can make the minimization private (in a certain sense), then each x t (and hence the final point x) will satisfy constraint privacy. Note that if the oracle privately minimizes over K, the final point x will automatically be in K since K is convex. Hence, we can also think of K as the public constraints, the ones that are always satisfied.
Theorem 11. Let ǫ, δ, T > 0, and let
with smoothness parameter s ∈ N. Suppose the oracle is ǫ ′ -private, where on neighboring instances the inputs y, y ′ satisfy
and the matrices A, A ′ are exactly the same except one has an additional row, and the vectors b, b ′ except one has a corresponding additional entry. Then, Algorithm 2 run with this oracle and smoothness s is (ǫ, δ)-constraint private.
Proof. If the oracle is ǫ ′ -differentially private, then (ǫ, δ)-constraint privacy for the whole algorithm follows directly by composition (Theorem 6).
To show that the oracle is private when adding or removing a constraint from the LP, we know that A, A ′ are exactly the same except one has an extra row, and we know that y ∞ ≤ 1/s since we have projected into the set K s . Hence, it only remains to check that neighboring y, y ′ satisfy y − y ′ 1 ≤ 2/s for each timestep t. We use a result about the sensitivity of Bregman projections from from Hsu et al. [18] ; we reproduce the proof for completeness. 
Dividing through by s, we are done.
Since y, y ′ are identical except for the weight corresponding to the differing constraint, we are done by the lemma.
Private Fractional Set Cover
Now that we have presented a general constraint private LP solver, let us consider an example. We demonstrate our techniques with the example of the fractional set cover LP, though our arguments extend to constraint private LPs with a private oracle that has low width. (For example, many covering and packing LPs satisfy this property.)
Suppose there are d sets, each covering some subset of m people. Each set has a cost c S , and we wish to select the cheapest collection of sets that covers every person. We will consider the fractional relaxation of this problem, where instead of selecting whole sets for the cover, we can decide to select a fraction of each set, i.e., each set can be chosen to some non-negative degree, and the cost for set S is the degree to which it is open times c S . We again want the cheapest fractional collection of sets, such that at least weight 1 covers each person. 4 To formulate this as a linear program, let the variables be x ∈ R d + ; variable x S will be the degree that we choose set S in the cover. For the constraints, let a i ∈ {0, 1} m such that a iS is 1 exactly when set S covers i.
We will assume that the optimal value OPT is known, and the goal is to compute an approximate fractional set covering x * corresponding to OPT. This is equivalent to solving the following linear program:
find: x ∈ K such that a i · x ≥ 1 for each i where K is the feasible region {x ∈ R d + | c · x = OPT}. We wish to achieve constraint privacy: if each individual corresponds to a covering constraint, then we want an approximate solution that is insensitive to whether a person i needs to be covered or not. This is not always possible-if each set contains just one person, then the presence of a set in any valid covering will reveal information about the people that need to be covered. Thus, we will be satisfied with a solution violating a few constraints, so only covering most people.
To use our constraint private LP solver, we first define a private oracle solving the minimization problem Oracle(y) = argmin
Since the oracle is minimizing a linear function, the optimal point lies at a vertex of K and is of the form
for some i, where e i is the i'th standard basis vector, i.e., all zeros except for a 1 in the i'th coordinate. We can use the exponential mechanism to privately select this vertex.
Lemma 13. Let γ ∈ (0, 1) be given. Suppose y ∞ ≤ 1/s, and suppose that y − y ′ ∞ ≤ 2/s on adjacent inputs. Let Oracle(y) be the ǫ-private exponential mechanism over the vertices of K with quality score
Then Oracle is an (α, γ)-approximate, ρ-bounded oracle, with
Proof. The width of the oracle is clear: when returning a point x = OPT c i e i ,
For accuracy, note that the quality score Q has sensitivity at most ∆ = 3 OPT c min · s .
Why? On neighboring databases, there are two possible changes: first we may have |y i − y ′ i | ≤ 2/s, and second we may have an extra term in the sum on one neighbor (since the sum is taken over all constraints, and one neighboring instance has an extra constraint). The first source contributes sensitivity 2 OPT /(c min s), and since y ∞ , y ′ ∞ ≤ 1/s, the second source contributes sensitivity OPT /(c min s). Now, since there are d possible outputs, the accuracy guarantee for the exponential mechanism (Theorem 5) shows that Oracle selects a point with additive error at most α = 2∆ ǫ log d log(1/γ) = 6 OPT c min sǫ log d log(1/γ) with probability at least 1 − γ. Hence, we are done. Now, it follows that Algorithm 2 solves the private fractional set cover problem with the following accuracy guarantee. Theorem 14. Let β ∈ (0, 1). With probability at least 1 − β, Algorithm 2 with the exponential mechanism as an oracle (Lemma 13)-where ρ is the width of the oracle and α ≤ 9ρ-gives a point x * such that there is a set C of at most s constraints with A i x * ≥ 1 − α for each i / ∈ C, where
Algorithm 2 is also ǫ-private when adding or removing a constraint.
Proof. Let ǫ ′ be as in Theorem 11, and let γ = β/T with T as in Algorithm 2. Unfolding the definition of ǫ ′ and ρ and applying Lemma 13, the oracle gives accuracy
c 2 min ǫsα with probability at least 1 − γ. Set this equal to α/3. By assumption α ≤ 9ρ, so Theorem 10 applies: with probability at least 1 − β, there is a set S of at most s constraints such A i x * ≥ 1 − α for every i / ∈ S, where
and γ = β/T .
Remark 15. The problem of efficient private set cover has been investigated by Gupta et al. [12] ; the solution we provide here is incomparable. On the one hand, we may fail to satisfy some of the coverage constraints, and if we imagine that each uncovered element can be covered at a cost of 1, our approximation guarantee now depends on OPT unlike the guarantee of Gupta et al. [12] .
On the other hand, we output an explicit solution whereas the algorithm of Gupta et al. [12] outputs an implicit solution, a "set of instructions" that describes a set cover when paired with the private data. (Their approach can also be interpreted as satisfying the weaker guarantee of joint differential privacy [20] rather than standard differential privacy.) Finally, our techniques apply to general constraint-private linear programs, not just set cover.
Low-Sensitivity LPs
Let us now turn to low-sensitivity LPs. Recall that for these LPs, the distance between adjacent inputs decreases as the size of the database (i.e., the number of individuals) grows. First, a few simplifying assumptions. Like above, we will continue to solve feasibility LPs of the following form:
Unlike the case for general constraint private LPs, we require that the feasible solution is a distribution, i.e., is non-negative and has ℓ 1 norm 1. Note that if the optimal solution has ℓ 1 norm L, then the rescaled LP
has a distribution as a solution. Our algorithms will find a point x * such that Ax * ≤ b/L + α · 1, so if we set α = α ′ /L, then A(Lx * ) ≤ b + α ′ gives an approximate solution to the original, unscaled LP.
Solving LPs with Multiplicative Weights
Before getting into specific kinds of low-sensitivity LPs, we first review another standard method for solving LPs via the standard multiplicative weights algorithm presented in Algorithm 3.
Algorithm 3 The Multiplicative Weights Algorithm, M W η
Let A 1 be the uniform distribution on A For t = 1, 2, . . . , T :
Receive loss vector ℓ t (may depend on A 1 , . . . , A t ) For each a ∈ A: Update A t+1 a = e −ηℓ t a A t a for every a ∈ A Normalize A t+1 = A t+1 /|A t+1 | Unlike the dense multiplicative weights approach presented earlier (Algorithm 2), we use multiplicative weights to maintain a distribution over the variables rather than the constraints. 5 This distribution will be the candidate solution, and we define losses by the maximum constraint violation of this candidate solution at each step. The full algorithm is Algorithm 4.
In general, suppose we handle the maximization step in Algorithm 4 by a best response oracle.
with probability at least 1 − γ.
Algorithm 4 Solving for LP feasibility with primal multiplicative weights
Input A ∈ R m×d , b ∈ R m . Let x 1 be the uniform distribution in R d , ρ = max ij |A ij | be the width of the LP Set
For t = 1, . . . , T :
Compute losses ℓ
Update x t+1 from x t and ℓ t via multiplicative weights.
Then, the following accuracy guarantee is known. 
Query Release LPs
We will think of ∆ ∞ as decreasing in n; our accuracy guarantees will be trivial if this is not true.
The algorithm we use is a slight generalization of the offline private multiplicative weights algorithm [13, 16] (building on the influential work of Hardt and Rothblum [15] , who introduced the "online" variant). In our framework, we will express the algorithm as a differentially private variant of Algorithm 4 to solve these linear programs while preserving differential privacy.
Throughout, we assume that the vector b is private data. On neighboring databases, b can change by at most ∆ ∞ in ℓ ∞ norm. Looking at Algorithm 4, we see that the only place we touch the private data is in the dual oracle. Accordingly, if the dual oracle is private in b, then the whole algorithm is private.
Theorem 18. Let ǫ, δ, T be as in Algorithm 4, and let
Algorithm 4, run with an ǫ ′ -private dual oracle is (ǫ, δ)-differentially private.
Proof. Direct from composition (Theorem 6).
Just like in private multiplicative weights for private query release, the exponential mechanism gives an appropriate dual oracle.
Lemma 19. Let ǫ, γ > 0 be given, and suppose the vector b can differ by at most ∆ ∞ in ℓ ∞ norm on neighboring instances. Then, the ǫ-private exponential mechanism with quality score
Proof. This is ǫ-private by definition, and the accuracy follows from the accuracy of the exponential mechanism (Theorem 5)-the quality score is ∆ ∞ -sensitive in b, and the output ranges over the constraints, so has size m.
Combining the MW with the oracle, our private query private LP solver Algorithm 4 satisfies the following accuracy guarantee.
Theorem 20. Let α, β ∈ (0, 1) be given. Suppose the linear program Ax ≤ b has a distribution as a feasible solution. Algorithm 4, run with the exponential mechanism as a dual oracle (Lemma 19), is (ǫ, δ)-private and finds x * satisfying Ax * ≤ b + α · 1, with probability at least 1 − β, where
Proof. Let ǫ ′ be as in Theorem 18, and let γ = β/T with T from Algorithm 4. By Lemma 19, the ǫ ′ -private exponential mechanism with quality score
is an (α/3, γ)-approximate dual oracle for
Solving,
Remark 21. This bound generalizes the guarantee for the private multiplicative weights algorithm when privately generating synthetic data for linear queries [15] . In that setting, there is one variable for each element in some underlying data universe X (and so d = |X |), and there is one equality constraint for each of k linear queries (and so m = k).
Now, let us consider the low-sensitivity version of constraint privacy: neighboring instances have constraint matrices that differ to a small degree. We distinguish two further subcases: either every coefficient in each constraint can differ, or only a few coefficients in each constraint can differ. 
Row/Matrix Private LPs
Again, we will think of ∆ ∞ as decreasing in n; our accuracy guarantees will be trivial if this is not true. Our techniques work equally well whether only a single row of A or the entire matrix A can differ, so we will assume the latter. We also normalize the problem so each entry in A is bounded in [−1, 1] .
The basic idea is to use multiplicative weights over the primal variables, with a dual oracle selecting the most violated constraint-since the losses fed into the multiplicative weights algorithm now depend on private data (the matrix A), we add Laplace noise to the loss vectors as they are selected. The full algorithm is given in Algorithm 5.
Algorithm 5 Row/matrix private LP solver
Input
Compute private lossesl
For each i, update
We can now show privacy and accuracy for Algorithm 5. Proof. Algorithm 5 performs dT Laplace operations, and T oracle operations. Each operation is ǫ ′ -private, so this is at most 2dT ǫ ′ -private operations. By our choice of ǫ ′ and Theorem 6, the whole algorithm is (ǫ, δ)-differentially private.
We can show that the exponential mechanism is a private dual oracle.
Lemma 23. Let ǫ, γ > 0 be given, and suppose the matrix A can differ by at most ∆ ∞ in ℓ ∞ norm on neighboring instances. Let x be any distribution. Then, the ǫ-private exponential mechanism with quality score
Proof. Since x is a distribution, the quality score is ∆ ∞ -sensitive and accuracy follows from accuracy of the exponential mechanism (Theorem 5).
While previously our accuracy theorems followed from standard accuracy results for solving LPs using multiplicative weights, the proof for Algorithm 5 does not. Since the constraint matrix is private, Algorithm 4 perturbs the losses and requires a more custom analysis. So, we will need a standard regret bound for multiplicative weights.
Theorem 24 (Littlestone and Warmuth [22] ). Let A t be the distributions obtained by M W η with arbitrary losses ℓ t satisfying ℓ t ∞ ≤ 1. Suppose that η ≤ 1/2. Let A * = 1 a=a * , for some a * ∈ A. Then,
Theorem 25. Let β > 0. Suppose the program has a distribution as a feasible solution. Then, with probability at least 1 − β, Algorithm 5 run with the exponential mechanism as a dual oracle (Lemma 23) finds a solution x * such that Ax * ≤ b + α · 1, where
Proof. Let ǫ ′ be as in Theorem 22, T be from Algorithm 5, and γ = β/2dT . By Lemma 23, with probability at least 1/γ, the oracle's choices satisfy
for all constraints i. Note that the left hand side is equal to
Taking a union bound over all T steps, this is true for all p t with probability at least 1 − β/2d ≥ 1 − β/2; condition on this event. By a tail bound on the Laplace mechanism (Lemma 3), with probability at least 1 − γ, a noisy lossl t i satisfies
Column Private LPs
Rather than an entire row changing, neighboring LPs may differ in a column; that is, they differ in coefficients corresponding to a single variable. Again, we will think of ∆ 1 as decreasing in n; our accuracy guarantees will be trivial if this is not true. We can use a very slight modification of Algorithm 5 to solve these LPs privately; the algorithm is given in Algorithm 6.
Algorithm 6 Column private LP solver
Like before, we can show that the exponential mechanism can be used as a private dual oracle.
Lemma 26. Let ǫ, γ > 0 be given, and suppose the matrix A can differ by at most ∆ 1 in ℓ 1 norm on neighboring instances. Let x be any distribution. Then, the ǫ-private exponential mechanism with quality score
Proof. Since x is a distribution, the quality score is ∆ 1 -sensitive and accuracy follows from accuracy of the exponential mechanism (Theorem 5).
Theorem 27. Let ǫ, ǫ ′ , δ be as in Algorithm 6. Algorithm 6 run with an ǫ ′ -private dual oracle is (ǫ, δ)-differentially private.
Proof. Since the loss vector ℓ t can differ by at most ∆ 1 in ℓ 1 norm, adding Laplace noise with scale ∆ 1 /ǫ suffices for ǫ-differentially privacy. Thus, there are T Laplace and oracle mechanism steps, each ǫ ′ -private. By choice of ǫ ′ and composition, Algorithm 6 is (ǫ, δ)-differentially private.
Theorem 28. Let β > 0. Suppose the program has a distribution as a feasible solution. Then, with probability at least 1 − β, Algorithm 6 run with the exponential mechanism (Lemma 26) as oracle finds a point x * such that Ax * ≤ b + α · 1, where
Proof. Let ǫ ′ be as in Theorem 27, T be as inAlgorithm 6, and γ = β/2dT . Letting the dual oracle by the ǫ ′ -private exponential mechanism, the proof is nearly identical to Theorem 25. The main difference is that we need
for everything to go through. By unfolding definitions, it suffices to take
Comparing the two previous algorithms, note ∆ ∞ ≤ ∆ 1 ≤ d∆ ∞ . Algorithm 5 performs better when the right inequality is tighter, i.e., when all the coefficients in a row can differ by a small amount. In contrast, Algorithm 6 performs better when the left inequality is tighter, that is, when a few coefficients in a row can differ by a larger amount.
Objective Private LPs
For our final type of low-sensitivity LP, we consider linear programs with objectives that depend on private data. We show that a very simple approach-randomized response-can solve these types of LPs accurately. Throughout, we will assume that the optimal solution to the LP has ℓ 1 weight equal to 1. We start with an LP in general form: Theorem 29. Suppose an objective private LP has optimal objective OPT, and has optimal solution with ℓ 1 weight 1. Defineĉ
where the noise is d independent draws from the Laplace distribution. Then releasing the perturbed LP
is (ǫ, δ)-differentially private. With probability 1 − β, solving the perturbed LP non-privately yields a point x * such that Ax * ≤ b and c ⊤ x * ≥ OPT −α, where
Proof. Since the ℓ 1 sensitivity of c is 1 and d numbers are released, (ǫ, δ)-privacy follows from the composition theorem (Theorem 6). 6 For the accuracy, note that with probability at least 1 − β/d, a single draw of the Laplace distribution is bounded by
By a union bound, this happens with probability at least 1 − β for all d draws; condition on this event. Then, note that if x * is the optimal solution to the original LP, then it is also a feasible solution to the perturbed LP. Letx * be the optimal solution of the perturbed LP. Since the noise added to each objective coefficient is bounded by α/2, if
contradicting optimality ofx * in the perturbed program. Thus, this algorithm finds an exactly feasible, α-optimal solution.
Lower Bounds
Now that we have considered various low-sensitivity LPs, let us turn to high-sensitivity LPs. In this section, we show that most high-sensitivity LPs cannot be solved privately to non-trivial accuracy. The exception is constraint private LPs-as we saw (Section 3), these can be solved in a relaxed sense. Our lower bounds are all reductions to reconstruction attacks: as the following theorem shows, differential privacy precludes reconstructing a non-trivial fraction of a database. The idea of reconstruction being a key feature of privacy violation is due to Dinur and Nissim [6] . The following theorem is folklore; we provide a proof for completeness.
Theorem 30. Let mechanism M : {0, 1} n → [0, 1] n be (ǫ, δ)-differentially private, and suppose that for all database D, with probability at least
The same is true even if D is restricted to have exactly n/2 zero entries.
Proof. If we have M as in the hypothesis, then we can round each entry of M(D) to {0, 1} while preserving (ǫ, δ)-differential privacy. Note that by assumption M(D) − D 1 ≤ αn, so the number of entries M(D) i that are more than 1/2 away from D i is at most 2αn. Thus, rounding reconstructs a database in {0, 1} n at most 2αn distance from the true database in ℓ 1 norm; hence we may assume that M(D) ∈ {0, 1} n with ℓ 1 norm at most 2αn from D.
Assume n is even; we prove the case where the input database D has exactly n/2 zero entries. Let D ∈ {0, 1} n have exactly n/2 zero entries, and sample an index i such that D i = 1, and an index j such that D j = 0, both uniformly at random from [n] . Let D ′ be identical to D except with bits i and j swapped. By assumption, we have that with probability at least 1 − β
Since i is chosen uniformly, we also know
Finally,
as desired.
For each type of impossible private LP, we show how to convert a database D ∈ {0, 1} n to a LP, such that neighboring databases D, D ′ lead to neighboring LPs. We then show that a LP solver that privately solves this LP to non-trivial accuracy leads to a reconstruction attack on D, violating Theorem 30.
First, some notation. For the general LP
we say that x * is an α-feasible solution if Ax * ≤ b + α · 1. Likewise, we say that x * is an α-optimal solution if it is feasible, and c ⊤ x * ≥ max
High-Sensitivity Scalars
Consider a database D ∈ {0, 1} n , and the following LP:
Note that changing a single bit in D will change a single right hand side in a constraint by 1. Observe that this is similar to the query release LP (Section 4.2) because we are only allowing the right hand side of the constraints to change. However here we consider the setting where a single right hand side of a constraint changes arbitrarily, rather than the case where all the right hand side entries change by a small amount.
Theorem 31. Suppose mechanism M is (ǫ, δ)-differentially private on high-sensitivity constant LPs, and with probability at least 1 − β, finds an α-feasible solution. Then, α ≥ 1/2.
Proof. Consider the gadget LP above. Note that if M guarantees α < 1/2, then |x i − D i | < 1/2 so rounding x i to 0 or 1 will reconstruct D i exactly. By Theorem 30, this is impossible under differential privacy.
High-Sensitivity Objective
Consider a database D ∈ {0, 1} n with exactly n/2 zeros, and the following LP: Note that swapping a zero and a non-zero bit in D will change exactly two objective coefficients in the LP by 1. Observe that this is similar to the objective private LP (Section 4.5) because we are only allowing the objective to change. However here we consider the setting where a single objective coefficient changes arbitrarily, rather than by a small amount.
Theorem 32. Suppose mechanism M is (ǫ, δ)-differentially private on high-sensitivity objective LPs, and with probability at least 1 − β, finds an exactly feasible, additive (αn)-optimal solution. Then, α ≥ c(2ǫ, δ(1 + e ǫ ), β).
Proof. Consider the gadget LP above. Note that the optimal solution is x i = D i , with objective 0. With probability at least 1 − β, M finds a solution x * with objective at least −αn. In this case, x * places at most αn mass on indices with D i = 0, so at least (1 − α)n mass of D and x * are shared. Thus, D − x * 1 ≤ αn. Since a change in D leads to a distance two change in the LP, the composition is (2ǫ, δ(1 + e ǫ ))-private. By Theorem 30, α ≥ c(2ǫ, δ(1 + e ǫ ), β).
High-Sensitivity Constraints/Columns
Consider a database D ∈ {0, 1} n with exactly n/2 zeros, and the following LP: Note that changing a single bit in D will change coefficients in a single constraint in the LP by 1. Observe that this is similar to the column private LP (Section 4.4) because we are allowing the coefficients for a single variable to change. However here we consider the setting where this coefficient can change arbitrarily, rather than by only a small amount.
This problem is also a special case of constraint private LPs (Section 3) because the coefficients in one (i.e., the only) constraint can change arbitrarily. In the current setting, we want a solution that approximately satisfies all constraints, rather than just satisfying most of the constraints.
Theorem 33. Suppose mechanism M is (ǫ, δ)-differentially private on high-sensitivity constraint LPs, and finds an α-feasible solution that satisfies all public constraints with probability at least 1 − β. Then, α ≥ c(2ǫ, δ(1 + e ǫ ), β).
Proof. Consider the gadget LP above. Suppose with probability 1 − β, M finds x * such that Ax * − b ∞ ≤ α for the gadget LP. By reasoning analogous to Theorem 32, at least (1 − α)n of the mass of x * will coincide with D, hence α ≥ c(2ǫ, δ(1 + e ǫ ), β) by Theorem 30.
Also note that the LPs produced by this reduction differ only in the coefficients corresponding to two variables. Hence, Theorem 33 also shows that privately solving column private LPs to nontrivial accuracy is impossible. It's possible that a relaxed solution, similar to allowing unsatisfied constraints in the constraint-private case, could be possible under column privacy.
However, it is not enough to allow some constraints to be unsatisfied. Since we can simply duplicate the constraint in our lower bound gadget multiple times, producing a solution satisfying any single constraint to non-trivial accuracy is impossible under high-sensitivity column privacy. A different relaxation would be needed for non-trivial accuracy under column privacy.
Discussion
In this paper, we have initiated the study of privately solving general linear programs. We have given a taxonomy of private linear programs, classified by how the private data affects the LP. For each type of linear program in the taxonomy, we have either given an efficient algorithm, or an impossibility result.
One natural question is, to what extent do our results extend to other private convex programs, e.g., semidefinite programs (SDPs)? A tempting approach is to to use the Matrix Multiplicative Weights algorithm of Arora and Kale [1] for solving SDPs. However, certain features of the standard multiplicative weights algorithm which we use crucially-such as compatibility with Bregman projections-seem more delicate when using Matrix Multiplicative Weights.
